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A SURVEY OF RECENT TAKINGS CASES IN THE
COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS AND THE




We undertake in this Article to survey takings cases decided by the United
States Court of Federal Claims and by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in the period following the publication of a similar
survey in this journal in 1991.1 Thus, while we deal with some cases decided
in 1991, the bulk of the cases we survey were decided in 1992 and through
mid-1993.
I. REGULATORY TAKINGS
A. Reasonable Expectations In A Regulated World
In many of their recent takings decisions, the United States Court of Fed-
eral Claims (formerly the Claims Court)2 and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit analyzed the legitimate expectations of prop-
erty owners by focusing on the regulatory scheme that governed the prop-
erty at the time it was acquired. Although the courts referred often to the
* George W. Miller and Jonathan L. Abram are partners in the law firm of Hogan &
Hartson. They are counsel for Whitney Benefits, Inc. and Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., plaintiffs in
Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989), modified, 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990),
aff'd, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991). They also filed amicus
briefs in support of the petitioners in Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2035 (1993), and
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). In addition, Mr. Miller
represented William Center L.P. and NV Homes L.P. in their action in the Claims Court for
just compensation arising out of the legislative taking that gave rise to Board of County Super-
visors v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 205 (1991), complaint dismissed, 27 Fed. Cl. 339 (1992).
David M. Tyler, an associate with Hogan & Hartson, provided research assistance for this
Article.
1. Roger J. Marzulla & Nancie G. Marzulla, Regulatory Takings in the United States
Claims Court: Adjusting the Burdens That in Fairness and Equity Ought to be Borne by Society
as a Whole, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 549 (1991).
2. The Claims Court was renamed the United States Court of Federal Claims effective
October 29, 1992. See Court of Federal Claims Technical and Procedural Improvements Act
of 1992, § 902, Pub. L. No. 102-572, Title IX, 106 Stat. 4516 (1992).
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Supreme Court's recent decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil,' their ultimate decisions follow a long line of cases applying a simple
principle-those who buy property subject to a preexisting regulatory
scheme will have great difficulty showing that a later regulatory action went
so far beyond that which a reasonable owner would have anticipated as to
effect a taking of their property.
1. Lucas And an Owner's "Title to Begin With"
In Lucas, the Supreme Court dealt a blow to regulators of property use by
completely rejecting the hoary "nuisance exception"-the notion that some
uses of property are so harmful or "noxious" that they can be prohibited
even to the point of destroying the value of property without the need to pay
compensation.4 That exception, the Court explained, was nothing but a turn
in the historical road toward the Court's modem recognition of the states'
broad police power.5
Instead, in a holding that has rooted several of the Court of Federal
Claims' decisions since, the Supreme Court explained that the power of gov-
ernment to regulate a particular owner's property without paying compensa-
tion depends on the state of the law at the time he acquired the property. In
Lucas, the Court stated that "[w]here the State seeks to sustain regulation
that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the
owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his
title to begin with.",6 Thus, after Lucas, states may prohibit all economically
beneficial use of land only if the prohibition "does not proscribe a productive
use that was previously permissible under relevant property and nuisance
principles." 7
By imposing compensation obligations on legislative action in this way,
the Court surely must have imagined that its holding would protect property
owners against regulatory excesses imposed after they acquired their prop-
erty. With a nod to Lucas's focus on the state of the law at the time land
was acquired, however, the Court of Federal Claims has headed in exactly
the opposite direction. In doing so, the court has identified a major question
3. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2897.
6. Id. at 2899. The Court noted that this view "has traditionally been guided by the
understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle
of rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to property." Id.
7. Id. at 2901. "When... a regulation that declares 'off-limits' all economically produc-
tive or beneficial uses of land goes beyond what the relevant background principles would
dictate, compensation must be paid to sustain it." Id.
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left open after Lucas: Must preexisting law have precluded precisely the use
at issue before regulators will be permitted to prohibit it without incurring
compensation obligations?
2. Preseault-Title and Trails
The Court of Federal Claims' decision in Preseault v. United States' sug-
gests that the preexisting regulatory scheme need not have addressed the
later-prohibited use very specifically at all. In Preseault, the court con-
fronted the impact of the "Rails to Trails" statute on the owners of property
subject to railway easements. 9 Under the statute, actually called the Na-
tional Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 (the National Trails Act),' °
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was authorized to preserve for
possible future railroad use any right-of-way that would otherwise be aban-
doned and to allow interim use of the land as a recreational trail." In
Preseault, the plaintiffs, who claimed reversionary interests in a former rail-
road's right-of-way, alleged that the right-of-way consisted of railroad ease-
ments; that these easements had been abandoned; that upon abandonment,
the land reverted to them; and that the ICC therefore effected a taking of
their property when it approved an agreement between the State of Vermont
and the City of Burlington for use of their land as a bicycle trail.' 2
The Court of Federal Claims, in an opinion by Judge Nettesheim, rejected
that claim. Using Lucas as a guide, the court held that the plaintiffs had no
reasonable expectation of being able to use the land subject to the railway
easement immediately after rail service ceased.' 3 According to the court,
Lucas "fixes the date on which the claimant acquires his interest for deter-
mining whether he possesses a compensable property interest."' 4 On that
basis, the court traced the history of state railroad regulation dating back to
the nineteenth century and the history of federal railroad regulation to not
much more modern times.'" The court was careful to warn that the mere
assertion of "general regulatory authority" over property was insufficient to
undermine its owner's expectation of using it free of regulatory prohibi-
tions:" "The conversion to trails, with the attendant postponement of the
ripening of reversionary interests, had to be in the picture in order to cir-
8. 27 Fed. C1. 69 (1992), appeal docketed, No. 93-5067 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 28, 1993).
9. Id. at 92-94.
10. Pub. L. No. 98-11, 97 Stat. 48 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1988)).
11. Id.
12. Preseault, 27 Fed. C1. at 71.
13. Id. at 94.
14. Id. at 87.
15. Id. at 73-81.
16. Id. at 90.
1993]
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cumscribe a compensable property interest at the date of [plaintiffs'] acquisi-
tion [of the land]."'
17
Having said that, however, the court then found that the regulatory
scheme in place at the time the Preseaults bought their land was sufficient to
undermine any expectation they might have had of being free to use the land
after it ceased to be used for railroad purposes. 8 According to the court, the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act),' 9
which predated the plaintiffs' purchase, was enough to deny them any com-
pensable property interest. 20 Yet, as described by the court, the 4-R Act's
substantive provisions did little more than seek to maintain as much rail
service as possible, in the face of an escalating pace of railway
abandonments. 2 '
The only two provisions of the 4-R Act described by the court that might
be thought related to the conversion to trails were § 809(b)(3), which di-
rected the Secretary of the Interior "to provide financial assistance to all
governmental entities 'for programs involving the conversion of abandoned
railroad rights-of-way to recreation and conservational uses,' ,22 with trails
being one of the specifically enumerated uses; and § 809(c), which "author-
17. Id.
18. Id. at 94.
19. Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
20. Preseault, 27 Fed. Cl. at 93. The court noted that the plaintiff's predecessors in inter-
est were forced to convey their land holdings for the construction of the railroad, and that the
4-R Act "ha[s] not expanded or changed the right-of-way. The easement is subject to a differ-
ent, governmentally-sanctioned use that is compatible with preservation and resumption of rail
traffic." Id. Reviewing the operation of the 4-R Act on the plaintiffs' property rights, the
court held:
All the property interests involved in this case were acquired after passage of this
legal framework. Although the ICC could not defer issuing a certificate of abandon-
ment indefinitely, the ripening of plaintiffs' interests depended on an incongruous
series of events: (1) an ICC finding that the rail property was not suitable for public
use; or (2) no one willing to buy, lease, or exchange for the rail property; and (3) no
other way to dispose of the property. Moreover, plaintiffs acquired their interests
between 1979 and 1990 against a backdrop of state law that for years would not have
recognized ripening of a reversionary interest in a railroad easement without issuance
of a certificate of abandonment. Although plaintiffs' reversionary interests could
have ripened had no trail operator presented itself, the ICC would not have issued an
unconditional certificate of abandonment had one been on the scene. Plaintiffs' argu-
ment that this interest would have reverted automatically by operation of law before
the 1983 amendments and section 1247(d) is frustrated by the 4-R Act's detailed
provisions for prereversionary disposal of public purpose railroad properties and the
deferential law of Vermont.
Id. at 94. The court concluded that "Itlhe nature of the encumbrance remained the same; the
use to which the easements were put, evolving from railroading to railbanking, is consistent
with preserving the easements for rail use." Id.
21. Id. at 78-79.
22. Id. at 78 (quoting 4-R Act § 809(b), 90 Stat. at 145).
[Vol. 42:863
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ized the ICC to delay the disposition of rail property for up to 180 days after
the effective date of an order permitting abandonment, unless the property
had first been offered for sale on reasonable terms for public uses, including
recreational use.",23 If anything, these provisions suggest that after enact-
ment of the 4-R Act, one considering the purchase of land subject to a rail
easement would have expected the ICC to try to work out a sale of the land
for recreational uses, not that it would unilaterally declare the property usa-
ble for that purpose, as the later National Trails Act authorized.
Although the court in Preseault relied squarely on Lucas, earlier cases
recognized that one who buys land subject to a preexisting regulatory
scheme can have no legitimate expectation of using it in any way inconsis-
tent with that scheme. 24 For example, in Ciampitti v. United States,25 the
Claims Court did not need Lucas to follow this line of decisions and hold
that a person who buys land knowing it to contain wetlands suffers no com-
pensable taking when the government prohibits filling of the wetlands.26
Similarly, in American Satellite Co. v. United States,2 the court did not need
Lucas to hold that a person who contracts to send his satellite on the space
23. Id. (citing 4-R Act § 809(b)(3), 90 Stat. at 145 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10906 (1988)));
see note following 49 U.S.C. § 10906 (1982). The 4-R Act contained a general statement of
purpose and certain reporting provisions, indicating a congressional concern about the pace at
which railroad rights-of-way were being abandoned. Preseault, 27 Fed. Cl. at 78. Other than
the provision for financial assistance to enable "recreation and conservational uses," the only
substantive provisions described by the court required the Secretary of Transportation to pro-
vide financial assistance to states to cover costs associated with continued rail service, and to
establish a "federal rail bank" for the purpose of preserving existing rail service in certain
areas. Id. at 78-79.
24. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefits Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986) (holding that
employers on notice that pension plans were regulated and that withdrawal from plan might
trigger additional financial obligations); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)
(Monsanto on notice of the EPA's authority to use data submitted to it, and therefore had no
reasonable, investment-backed expectation that the data would be kept confidential); see also
Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for
Southern California, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2291-92 (1993) (holding that employers on notice of
pension regulations).
25. 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991).
26. Id. at 320 (citing Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1006; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978)). The court noted that the landowner
had more than ample warning prior to purchase that the property was encumbered
by a likelihood that it could not be developed ....
To find that the Federal Government has taken a property interest in the form of a
distinct, reasonable, investment-backed expectation, would, in this instance, turn the
Government into an involuntary guarantor of [the landowner]'s gamble. This, the
court declines to do.
Id. at 321.
27. 26 Cl. Ct. 146 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, No. 92-5136, 1993 WL 242669 (Fed.
Cir. July 7, 1993).
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shuttle suffered no taking of his contract rights when, in the wake of the
Challenger disaster, the President limited shuttle space to shuttle-specific or
national security-related cargoes.2 8 Given the government's known propen-
sity to use the shuttle as a tool of national space policy and to implement the
country's economic, security, and foreign policy interests, it would have been
"an exercise in blind optimism for the plaintiff to assume that space policy
would remain static.",
29
Lucas did have a role in the rationale of the Preseault decision, however.
The Lucas decision motivated the Court of Federal Claims' stated refusal to
deny the Preseaults' property right based only on a mere assertion of "gen-
eral regulatory authority" over the land before they bought it.3" Even
though the preexisting regulatory scheme did not accomplish much more
than that, the court at least expressed its insistence on a more specific regula-
tory focus prior to acquisition-a focus on "[tihe conversion to trails"-
before it would find that the state of the law limited the Preseaults' legiti-
mate expectations when they bought their land. 3' This distinction was based
on the court's analysis of the disagreement in Lucas between Justice Stevens,
who would have been satisfied with the " 'generality of a regulation of prop-
erty,' ,32 and the majority, which insisted on a "brightline test which would
have the only relevant expectancies be those firmly rooted in law on the date
of the acquisition of property."'33 The specificity with which prior law must
have addressed a particular use will undoubtedly be the focus of additional
post-Lucas litigation.
3. Bank Seizures-The Classic Known Risk
The Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims adopted a similarly
general focus on preexisting regulatory schemes when, in several cases, they
considered and rejected claims that bank regulators effected takings by seiz-
ing failing or failed financial institutions and disposing of their assets. The
courts' adoption of the more general focus led to an intuitive result-the risk
of business failure is known to anyone who enters the business world, and
although the procedure may change, if the business is banking, the conse-
quence of failing is seizure.
28. Id. at 160.
29. Id.
30. Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. C1. 69, 90 (1992).
31. Id.
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In California Housing Securities, Inc. v. United States,34 the plaintiff, Cali-
fornia Housing Securities, bought the Saratoga Savings and Loan Associa-
tion a year after it became a California-chartered savings and loan
institution. 31 California required its savings and loan institutions to partici-
pate in a deposit insurance program.36 Accordingly, Saratoga applied for
and received federal deposit insurance from the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)." Under the statutory and regulatory
scheme as it existed at that time, Saratoga pledged it would comply with
FSLIC regulations, and it understood it could be put in receivership in cer-
tain circumstances defined by statute, including a "substantial dissipation of
assets or earnings" arising from any violation of applicable regulations and
"any unsafe or unsound practice."38 As receiver, FSLIC would then have
the authority to liquidate the institution or make "such other disposition of
the matter as it deem[ed] to be in the best interests of the institution, its
savers, and the [FSLIC]."39
The year 1989 brought structural changes to savings and loan regulation,
with enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),4 and creation of the Office of Thrift
Supervision and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC).41 Shortly there-
after, the RTC was appointed receiver of Saratoga and liquidated the
institution.42
As owner of Saratoga, California Housing Securities filed suit, claiming
that the RTC had taken its property by physical seizure."3 The Claims
Court denied relief, and the Federal Circuit agreed." Saratoga voluntarily
entered the savings and loan industry in California, and California Housing
Securities voluntarily bought it thereafter. As a participant in this " 'longest
regulated and most closely supervised of public callings,' "" Saratoga
understood,
34. 959 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 324 (1992).
35. Id. at 955.
36. Id. (citing CAL. FIN. CODE § 5006(2) (West 1991)).
37. Id.
38. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A)(ii) (1988) (amended by Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 282
(1989)).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(3)(B) (1988) (repealed 1989).
40. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered section of 12
U.S.C.).
41. Id. §§ 301, 501, 103 Stat. at 278, 369 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1468 (Supp. II
1990) and scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 12 U.S.C.).
42. California Housing Sec., Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955, 956 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 324 (1992).
43. Id. at 956-57.
44. Id. at 957, 961.
45. Id. at 958 (quoting Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947)).
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with what may only be viewed as a historically rooted expectation,
that the federal government would take possession of its premises
and holdings as conservator or receiver if it substantially dissipated
its "assets or earnings due to any violation or violations of law or
regulations, or to any unsafe or unsound practice or practices[.]
' 46
Thus, no taking occurred when this known possibility came to pass.4 7
The Claims Court anticipated this reasoning and result in American Con-
tinental Corp. v. United States,48 decided a year before California Housing
Securities, and the court used the same approach in Golden Pacific Bancorp
v. United States,49 decided a month after. All three cases are premised on
the assumption that anyone buying an asset subject to as long-standing and
extensive a regulatory scheme as the banking and savings and loan industries
has no expectation of being treated any differently than any other participant
in those industries.5
0
46. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A)(ii) (1988) (amended 1989) (alteration in
original)).
47. Id. at 959-60 (citing Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227
(1986); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984)).
48. 22 Cl. Ct. 692 (1991).
49. 25 Cl. Ct. 768 (1992), appeal docketed, No. 92-5141 (Fed. Cir. July 9, 1992).
50. The Court of Federal Claims and Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have de-
cided one banking case out of this mold. In Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797
(Fed. Cir. 1993), the plaintiff did not enter the industry in the ordinary way. Instead, Winstar
bought a failing S&L, Windom Federal, pursuant to a negotiated agreement with the relevant
regulatory agencies, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and the FSLIC. Id. at
803. Under a "forbearance letter" from the FHLBB (made part of Winstar's "Assistance
Agreement" with the FSLIC), Winstar was permitted to treat any excess in the cost of acquisi-
tion over the fair market value of Windom's assets-that is, Windom's capital deficit-as an
asset, to call it goodwill, and to amortize it over a period of 35 years. Winstar Corp. v. United
States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112, 113-15 (1990). On its enactment five years later, FIRREA changed the
rules. Under FIRREA, "supervisory goodwill" could not exceed a specified percentage of an
S&L's assets and could be amortized over a period of no more than 20 years. Winstar, 994
F.2d at 805. Winstar sued, claiming that by enacting FIRREA, the government had breached
its contract or, alternatively, had effected a taking of Winstar's contractual rights. Id. at 806-
07. The Claims Court agreed with Winstar, holding that Winstar had an enforceable contrac-
tual right to use the goodwill device in order to meet minimum capital requirements. Winstar
Corp. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 541 (1992).
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that when Winstar agreed to assist the FSLIC by
buying the failing thrift, it could have negotiated a more explicit agreement with the govern-
ment: "[O]ne who wishes to obtain a contractual right against the sovereign that is immune
from the effect of future changes in law must make sure that the contract confers such a right
in unmistakable terms." Winstar, 994 F.2d at 809 (quoting Transohio Say. Bank v. Director,
Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Western Fuels-
Utah, Inc. v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 7130, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990))); see also
Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding
that Congress may abrogate a state's previous right to withdraw from the Social Security sys-
tem). Even that might not have been enough. The Federal Circuit suggested in dicta that the
government's power to act as sovereign "cannot be contracted away," Winstar, 994 F.2d at
810 (quoting North Am. Commercial Co. v. United States, 171 U.S. 110, 137 (1898)), and that
[Vol. 42:863
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Therefore, as in Preseault and Ciampitti, the lesson of California Housing
Securities is that Lucas has worked no revolution, at least as far as the Court
of Federal Claims is concerned. In order to recover against the government
for later expansion of a preexisting regulatory scheme, owners have long had
to show that the new regulation was so qualitatively different from the prior
scheme as not to have been reasonably foreseeable."
4. Governmental Delay-Another Known Risk
Owners of regulated property universally expect delay at the hands of reg-
ulators, and the Court of Federal Claims has continued to deny temporary
taking relief when regulators dawdle. In 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. United
States,52 for example, the owner of a small wetlands parcel applied in April
1981 for a permit to fill the parcel so that it could be used for commercial
and industrial development.53 The Army Corps of Engineers issued several
preliminary decisions denying the permit, and each time, the owner applied
again.54 Thereafter, the owner sued in federal district court and, after trial,
won an order directing the Corps to issue the permit.5 The Corps finally
did so in April 1985, four years after the initial application and long after
several required state and local permits had expired. The Claims Court
"a State need not 'adhere to a contract that surrenders an essential attribute of its sover-
eignty.'" Id. (quoting United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977)). The
court added that because the right to contract does not empower a private party to restrict acts
of Congress, "the government's agents of the executive branch, acting by way of contracting
authority, cannot do so either." Id. This ruling against one who actually contracted with the
government bodes ill for those without a contract who claim a later change in the regulatory
scheme effects a taking. By order dated August 18, 1993, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit granted rehearing en banc in Winstar.
51. One aspect of FIRREA's regulatory expansion might possibly be held to work so
radical a change from the preexisting scheme as to support a taking claim. Under traditional
common law rules, one affiliated bank could be held responsible for the liabilities of another on
the same basis as any other corporate affiliate could be-on a showing of failure to honor
corporate formalities or other circumstances that would justify treating the assets of one corpo-
ration as the assets of its affiliate. In order to provide an additional source of clean-up funds,
however, FIRREA contained a "cross-guarantee" provision, which essentially allowed the
FDIC to impose a failed bank's liabilities on any of its affiliates, no matter how independently
they were operated by their common parent. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
While a buyer of a group of affiliated banks would take subject to this regulatory abrogation of
the traditional incidents of corporate ownership, one who owned affiliated banks before FIR-
REA was enacted might well suffer a taking by the FDIC's reliance on this provision to appro-
priate assets of a failed bank's healthy affiliate. See generally Christopher T. Curtis, The
Takings Clause and Regulatory Takeovers of Banks and Thrifts, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 367
(1990) (arguing against taking liability pre-Lucas). This issue has not been decided by the
Court of Federal Claims or the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
52. 26 Cl. Ct. 575 (1992).
53. Id. at 576.
54. Id. at 576-77.
55. Id. at 577.
19931
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found that the Corps' four-year delay interfered with no "legally protected
right,",56 despite the fact: that the Corps' denial of the permit was "arbitrary
and capricious."' 57 The court reasoned that governmental delay is an " 'in-
evitable cost of doing business in a highly regulated society.' ,95
B. The Parcel As A Whole: All Economically Viable Use Of What?
The Court of Federal Claims has focused on (but not resolved) another
central question left open by the Supreme Court in Lucas. The Lucas Court
recognized two instances when regulatory action is "compensable without
case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the re-
straint."59 The first is when an owner is compelled by regulation to suffer a
physical invasion of his property.' ° The second occurs when the regulation
or other action "denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land."' 1 That phrase has a long history in takings cases, 62 but it creates the
obvious problem of defining the property at issue. The Lucas Court frankly
acknowledged that the problem has never been resolved.63
The Claims Court took a very broad view of the "parcel as a whole" in
Ciampitti v. United States,64 a case decided before Lucas and whose reason-
ing may not survive it. After having developed a parcel of lots and selling
many of them, Ciampitti bought two tracts adjoining the subdivision.65 One
56. Id. at 581.
57. Id. at 582.
58. Id. at 582 n.6 (quoting Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 204 (1985)). For another Claims Court decision rejecting temporary tak-
ing claims based on the Corps' permitting delay, see Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl.
Ct. 1334, 1352-54 (1992), appeal docketed, No. 93-5029 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 23, 1992).
59. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
60. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see also Lu-
cas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
61. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
62. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260 (1980).
63. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. The Court observed:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically feasible use"
rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the "property
interest" against which the loss of value is to be measured. When, for example, a
regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is
unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been
deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as
one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a
whole.
Id.
64. 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318 (1991).
65. Id. at 312.
(Vol. 42:863
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was buildable; the other he knew to be wetlands.66 After the Corps of Engi-
neers refused him a permit to fill the wetlands portion, Ciampitti sued, alleg-
ing a taking of the wetlands portion.67 The court rejected his claim, and one
of its two independent reasons for doing so provides an instructive analysis
of the "parcel as a whole" problem.68
The Claims Court, in an opinion by Judge Bruggink, held that Ciampitti
had suffered only a partial diminution in the value of his tract, because both
the wetlands and the buildable portions of his property had to be considered
together. 69 The court held this to be the case even though the two portions
were not contiguous.70 The court listed several relevant factors to be consid-
ered in deciding whether to treat two sections of property as a whole includ-
ing "the degree of contiguity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which
the parcel has been treated as a single unit, [and] the extent to which the
protected lands enhance the value of remaining lands."71 The "most persua-
sive consideration" was that Ciampitti bought the two parcels simultane-
ously and treated them as a single parcel for purposes of the purchase and
financing.72 In addition, at least at the time he "began negotiating" the
purchase, Ciampitti still owned some of the lots in the subdivision in be-
tween, though many had already been sold off to consumers.73 Since the
buildable portion retained substantial value even after the Corps denied the
permit to fill the wetlands portion, the Corps' action only resulted in a de-
cline in the value of the parcel as a whole, which alone does not effect a
taking.74
66. Id.
67. Id. at 311.
68. Id. at 318-20. The other ground relied on in Ciampitti is discussed above-Ciampitti
bought the land knowing it was state-designated wetlands and therefore had no reasonable
investment-backed expectation of developing it. See id. at 321-22; see also supra section I.A.2.
69. Ciampitti, 22 Cl. Ct. at 318. The court pointed to the Supreme Court's holdings in
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987), and Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978), as the foundation for
the "parcel as a whole" inquiry. Ciampitti, 22 Cl. Ct. at 318. The court noted:
Admittedly, in those cases the Court was not directly dealing with a governmental
contention that additional land ought to be included in the calculus. Instead, the
question was whether certain rights within a "bundle" of rights could be segregated
and viewed separately. That same analysis may not always be appropriate in weigh-
ing the Government's contention that the analysis should be broadened to include
other property held by the plaintiff, but in the court's view, it fits here.
Id.
70. Ciampitti, 22 Cl. Ct. at 320.
71. Id. at 318.
72. Id. at 320.
73. Id.
74. Id. The court stated that it would be incorrect for the plaintiff to separate the parcels
for purposes of asserting a taking, and observed:
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Following the Ciampitti decision, the Lucas Court called into serious
question whether noncontiguous parcels can ever be considered together for
purposes of analyzing a regulation's impact.7 5 But because the issue was not
presented directly in Lucas-Lucas's two lots were rendered entirely value-
less by the prohibition against building-Lucas provides no real guidance
about how to define the parcel as a whole.7 6 Clearly, though, by creating an
automatic compensation rule whenever a regulation deprives an owner of
"all economically viable use" of his property, Lucas has raised the impor-
tance of the issue. If a regulation destroys the value of part of a tract while
the rest of the tract retains value, defining the "parcel" will often determine
whether a taking has occurred. Ciampitti's list of factors provides as useful a
basis as any for making this now critical finding.7 7
Ciampitti is, in effect, asking to isolate the least valuable portion of the purchase
when he himself saw the parcels as inextricably linked in September 1983. The court
concludes that "the parcel as a whole" must, in this case, include those uplands
purchased on September 15, 1983 which Ciampitti still owned as of June 5, 1986. A
residual value of $14 million precludes a finding that there was a taking.
Id.
75. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992). The Court
cited Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276-77 (1977),
aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), as "an extreme-and, we think, unsupportable-view of the rele-
vant calculus, where the state court examined the diminution in a particular parcel's value
produced by a municipal ordinance in light of the total value of the taking claimant's other
hodings in the vicinity." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7 (citation omitted).
76. Lucas's only contribution on this issue, aside from disparaging the treatment of non-
continuous parcels as a single whole, is to make clear that in assessing the scope of the prop-
erty taken, the
answer ... may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by
the State's law of property-ie., whether and to what degree the State's law has
accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with re-
spect to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. In offering this view, the Lucas Court contrasted two prior
Supreme Court decisions it found "inconsistent" with one another, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922), which the Court described as involving a "law restricting
subsurface extraction of coal held to effect a taking," Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7, and Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-502 (1987), which the Court
described as involving a "nearly identical law held not to effect a taking." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2894 n.7. The Court of Federal Claims has been clear in holding that property interests like
mineral rights that have long been recognized under state property law are separately cogniza-
ble in regulatory taking cases. See, e.g., Rybachek v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 222, 225 (1991)
(citing Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394, 405 (1989), modified, 20 Cl. Ct.
324 (1990), aff'd, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991)).
77. See also Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334, 1346 (1992) (post-Lucas
decision following Ciampitti's list of factors), appeal docketed, No. 93-5029 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 23,
1992).
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II. TAKINGS BY PHYSICAL OCCUPATION
A. Lucas and Physical Occupation
For years, the distinction between physical occupation of property and
excessive regulation of its use has been central to takings analysis. Physical
occupation has been said to amount to a taking almost automatically, while
regulatory excess amounts to a taking only after an "essentially ad hoc, fac-
tual" analysis.7 8 Lucas narrowed the area of uncertainty in the regulatory
context by making clear that a taking occurs "categorically" when a regula-
tion has the effect of denying an owner "all economically beneficial or pro-
ductive use of land."79 But by focusing regulatory taking analysis on the
expectations of the owner-i.e., on whether the prohibited use was "part of
his title to begin with"-the Lucas Court may have weakened the protection
against uncompensated physical occupations even as it marginally strength-
ened the protection against regulatory excess.
The United States is now defending even physical occupation claims by
arguing that a preexisting regulatory scheme can justify government action
that has the effect of allowing others entry onto private land. This argument
is exactly the opposite of the Lucas Court's categorical treatment of physical
occupations8 ° (and of the Court's holdings in earlier physical occupation
cases).8 Thus, for example, in Preseault v. United States, 82 the Preseaults
claimed that the National Trails Act not only effected a regulatory taking,
but that it also imposed a physical occupation of their land by allowing hik-
ers to enter after the land had reverted to them.83 The Government has
argued on appeal that even if this amounts to a physical occupation, it would
nevertheless not constitute a taking because the long-standing regulation of
railroad rights-of-way precluded any historically rooted expectation of un-
disturbed possession.84 The Government offered California Housing Securi-
ties, Inc. v. United States 85 as one of the major bases for this use of
78. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-35 (1982) (finding a taking where
physical occupation was installation of television cable in apartment buildings).
79. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
80. Id. at 2893.
81. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that a govern-
ment-imposed requirement that the public be allowed on property amounts to a taking by
physical occupation); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holding that a gov-
ernment-imposed easement of passage onto private land effected a taking by physical
occupation).
82. 27 Fed. Cl. 69 (1992).
83. Id. at 81.
84. Brief for the United States at 43-45, Preseault v. United States, Nos. 93-5067, 93-5068
(Fed. Cir. filed Jan. 28, 1993).
85. 959 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 324 (1992).
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expectations in a physical occupation case-if the outright seizure of a bank
effects no taking because of a preexisting regulatory scheme, then surely the
same can be true of a requirement that hikers be allowed to enter land.
8 6
There may be truth to that, but if so, then the new focus on expectations and
the "title to begin with" may have the unintended effect of introducing soft-
ness and uncertainty into the previously "categorical" requirement of com-
pensation in cases of physical occupation of real property.
B. Government Action
1. The Hendler Case-Owner's Non-Consent
In Hendler v. United States, 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit addressed whether the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) and the State of California's entry onto land located adjacent to a
hazardous waste site to install groundwater monitoring wells and to conduct
groundwater monitoring activities constituted either a regulatory taking or a
taking by physical occupation. 88 The case involved a decade-long dispute
between the EPA, California (which assisted EPA in its Superfund efforts),
and property owners. In September 1983, the EPA issued an administrative
order granting itself and California access to the property in order to con-
struct, operate, and maintain groundwater wells.89 Shortly thereafter, the
EPA and California commenced groundwater monitoring activities on the
property, located adjacent to the Stringfellow Acid Pits in Riverside County,
California.9 ° In 1984, the property owners filed a complaint in the Claims
Court alleging that the EPA's and California's activities constituted a com-
pensable taking.
9 1
Two different Claims Court judges heard the matter. Judge Mayer
granted the Government's summary judgment motion on the ground that no
regulatory taking occurred and that the government was not responsible for
California's activities on the property.92 Judge Mayer further denied the
property owners' summary judgment motion, which proceeded on the the-
ory that the government's physical occupation of the property constituted a
compensable taking.9 3 Later, Judge Robinson dismissed the property own-
ers' lawsuit with prejudice as a sanction for the property owners' failure to
86. Preseault, 27 Fed. CI. at 87 (citing California Housing, 959 F.2d at 958).
87. 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
88. Id. at 1367.
89. Id. at 1369.
90. Id. at 1369-70.
91. Id.
92. Hendler v. United States, 11 CI. Ct. 91 (1986), dismissed, 19 CI. Ct. 27 (1989), rev'd,
952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
93. Id. at 96-97.
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comply adequately with the Government's discovery requests.94 The prop-
erty owners appealed to the Federal Circuit.
In an opinion authored by Circuit Judge Plager, the Federal Circuit re-
versed. 95 The court of appeals first addressed the question of whether the
Claims Court erred by denying the owners' motion for summary judgment
on a regulatory taking theory. The court agreed with the Claims Court
holding that the issuance of EPA's order, which prohibited the property
owners from interfering with EPA's access to the property to install ground-
water monitoring wells, did not constitute, in and of itself, a regulatory tak-
ing.96 However, the Federal Circuit stated that "subsequent events, in light
of the character of the Government's action and plaintiffs' distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations, might have had sufficient economic impact on the
plaintiffs to constitute a regulatory taking." 97 In view of the fact-specific
inquiry involved, the Federal Circuit stated that "we understand the trial
judge to have refrained from deciding this issue on summary judgment. It
remains an issue in the case." 98
Having held that the Claims Court did not err in denying the property
owners' summary judgment motion on the theory that issuance of the EPA
order in and of itself had effected a regulatory taking, the Federal Circuit
next concluded that the actions of the EPA and California, in placing
groundwater wells on the plaintiffs' property, effected a taking under tradi-
tional physical occupation theory. 99 Accordingly, the court of appeals held,
the Claims Court erred in denying the property owners' motion for sum-
mary judgment on liability based upon that theory. " The court of appeals
recognized that the physical occupation cases require that the occupation be
"permanent" in order to constitute a compensable taking.'01 The court
held, however, that the term " 'permanent' does not mean forever, or any-
thing like it."' 2 Rather, the court stated, a taking by physical occupation
can be for a limited term, i.e., the interest taken may be an estate for years,
which has a term of finite duration as distinct from the infinite term of an
estate in fee simple absolute.'0 3 The court also noted that, while called an
94. Hendler v. United States, 19 CI. Ct. 27 (1989), rev'd, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
95. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
96. Id. at 1375.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1378-79.
100. Id. at 1375.
101. Id. at 1375-76 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982)).
102. Id. at 1376.
103. Id.
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estate for years, the duration of such an estate can be less than one year."
The court relied upon three cases involving physical occupations that oc-
curred during World War II.105
The court stated that there was nothing "temporary" about the wells the
government installed on the plaintiffs' property.10 6 After describing their
physical features, the court concluded that they were "at least as 'perma-
nent' . . . as the [cable television] equipment in Loretto, which comprised
only a few cables attached by screws and nails and a box attached by
bolts."'0 7 The court then observed that "[i]f the term 'temporary' has any
real world reference in takings jurisprudence, it logically refers to those gov-
ernmental activities which involve an occupancy that is transient and rela-
tively inconsequential, and thus properly can be viewed as no more than a
common law trespass quare clausum fregit."' os
The court also held that "the concept of permanent physical occupation
does not require that in every instance the occupation be exclusive, or con-
tinuous and uninterrupted."' 0 9 In that regard, the court relied on the
Supreme Court's decisions in Kaiser Aetna v. United States 110 and Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission."' In particular, the court cited language
from Nollan that " '[w]e think a "permanent physical occupation" has oc-
curred.., where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to
pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed,
104. Id. (citing JOHN E. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 54 (3d ed.
1989)).
105. Id. (citing Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v.
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373
(1945)).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 1377. The court described the distinction between a mere trespass and a physi-
cal occupation sufficient to constitute a taking in the following terms:
The distinction between the government vehicle parked one day on O's land while
the driver eats lunch, on the one hand, and the entry on O's land by the government
for the purpose of establishing a long term storage lot for vehicles and equipment, on
the other, is clear enough.
Id. at 1371.
The court went on to state that it did not need to decide in this case,
what physical occupancy, of what kind, for what duration, constitutes a Loretto tak-
ing. It is enough to say that, on the facts before the Claims Court on the motion for
summary judgment, we conclude that the occupancy by the Government was com-
fortably within the degree necessary to make out a taking.
Id. at 1377.
109. Id.
110. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
111. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself perma-
nently upon the premises.'" 1 12
The Federal Circuit characterized the evidence in Hendler as reflecting a
situation in which the government behaved as if it had acquired an easement
"not unlike that claimed in Kaiser Aetna."' 13 The court stated that pursu-
ant to the easement,
the Government at its convenience drove equipment upon plain-
tiffs' land for the purpose of installing and periodically servicing
and obtaining information from the various wells it had located
there. Kaiser Aetna and Nollan would seem to leave little doubt
that such activity, even though temporally intermittent, is not
'temporary.' It is a taking of the plaintiffs' right to exclude, for the
duration of the period in which the wells are on the property and
subject to the Government's need to service them." 4
The court of appeals concluded that the evidence supported the finding of
a taking by physical occupation, and held that the Claims Court erred in not
making such a finding. 115
Professor Philip Weinberg of St. John's University School of Law, in an
article in the Columbia Journal of Environmental Law has called the Federal
Circuit's decision in Hendler "troubling and wrong-headed.""' 6 Professor
Weinberg characterized the decision as "strange" and "mischievous,'
' 17
suggesting that Hendler is contrary to the district court's decision in United
States v. Charles George Trucking Co. ,11 a decision not cited by the Hendler
court. However, in that case the district court, while rejecting the owners'
challenge to the EPA's order to enter their property, nonetheless recognized
that "[i]f the implementation of the remedy works an effective taking of the
defendants' property, the defendants may have a justiciable claim that they
will be able to pursue in the Claims Court, pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1491."" 9
112. Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1377 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832).
113. Id. at 1378.
114. Id.
115. Id. The court stated:
The issue before the court in Hendler I was whether, on the facts before it, the Gov-
ernment took any property by permanent physical occupation, thus obliging it to pay
plaintiffs just compensation. The trial judge thought not, absent more facts; we think
nothing more needed to be shown. The trial judge denied plaintiffs' motion for sum-
mary judgment on this point; he should have granted it.
Id.
116. Philip Weinberg, Hendler v. United States: I'll Let You Save Me-If You Pay Me for
the Privilege, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 233 (1992).
117. Id. at 235, 244.
118. 682 F. Supp. 1260 (D. Mass. 1988).
119. Id. at 1271.
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Professor Weinberg also disagreed with the court of appeals' interpreta-
tion of the word "permanent."' 20 He stated that a physical occupation "of
temporary duration may constitute a taking if it completely deprives the
owner of the property for the duration of the appropriation."' 12 ' He stated
that the World War II cases relied upon by the Hendler court all involved
"total appropriations."' 122 By contrast, Professor Weinberg stated, "the
Supreme Court has consistently made clear that partial takings, or inverse
condemnations, which are occupations that do not completely deprive the
owner of the property, are actionable only if permanent in duration,"' 12 3 cit-
ing cases involving temporary or occasional flooding or overflows of
water, 2 as opposed to permanent or recurring flooding.' 25 The Federal
Circuit, however, reasoned that once the physical occupation went beyond
mere trespass the extent of the government's physical occupation of the
property was relevant only to the amount of compensation and not to
whether a taking had occurred. ' 26 Thus, the Hendler court held, the physi-
cal occupation of the plaintiffs' land in this case was sufficiently "perma-
nent" to qualify as a taking for which compensation was due even though
the occupation by the EPA and California was not "exclusive, or continuous
and uninterrupted" and would continue only so long as was necessary to
combat the groundwater pollution from the adjacent hazardous waste
site. 127
The Federal Circuit further held, in reversing the holding of the Claims
Court in Hendler, that California's activities in assisting the EPA in its
Superfund efforts were attributable to the government for purposes of the
property owners' takings claims.' 2 The Federal Circuit characterized the
activities of the EPA and California as "two ... coordinated parts of the
same undertaking," "29 noting that the authority of California personnel to




124. See, e.g., Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
126. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
127. Id. at 1377. The court made reference to the confusion arising from the use of the
term "temporary taking." Id. at 1376 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)). The court noted that all takings are "tempo-
rary" in that "the government can always change its mind at a later time." Id.; see also supra
notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
128. Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1379.
129. Id. at 1378.
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enter upon plaintiffs' property derived from a federal statute1 3' and the EPA
order issued pursuant thereto.'
3 1
2. The Janowsky and Meek Cases-Owner's Consent
In Janowsky v. United States, a2 the plaintiffs were the owners of a busi-
ness called Geno's Vending in Gary, Indiana. a3' The plaintiffs agreed to
permit the FBI to use their business as a front for an undercover investiga-
tion. a4 At the conclusion of the investigation, they brought suit in the
Claims Court seeking damages for breach by the FBI of an alleged implied-
in-fact contract to compensate them for their services and for the use of their
business. 135 Alternatively, the plaintiffs sought just compensation for what
they contended had been the inverse condemnation of their business by the
FBI.'3 6 In an opinion by Judge Turner, the Claims Court held that it lacked
jurisdiction over the contract claim and that the taking claim must be dis-
missed because, on the facts as pleaded, the plaintiffs had agreed to allow
their property to be used by the government. 37 Accordingly, the court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' taking claim for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. 38
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit which, in an unpublished opinion, reversed the Claims Court's
dismissal of the contract claim for lack of jurisdiction and remanded for
further consideration of that claim. 139 The court of appeals, in an opinion
130. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988)).
131. Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1378-79. The Federal Circuit also held that the Claims Court
abused its discretion in the second Hendler decision by dismissing the property owners' lawsuit
for failing to comply adequately with the Government's discovery requests. Id. at 1383.
132. 23 Cl. Ct. 706 (1991).




137. Id. at 711. The court noted the distinction between the taking of private property for
public use and the government's receipt of property pursuant to an agreement with the prop-
erty owner, stating that:
when a citizen delivers property to the government pursuant to an agreement, an
inverse condemnation claim does not arise simply because the government does not
pay; the property owner's consent to the arrangement vitiates a claim that the gov-
ernment took the property for public use within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment.
Id. at 713.
138. Id. at 716.
139. Janowsky v. United States, No. 92-5004, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 3617 (Fed. Cir. Feb.
17, 1993).
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authored by Circuit Judge Archer, also vacated Judge Turner's order dis-
missing the taking claim.' 0
The court of appeals noted that "[t]he parties do not dispute that if a
contract exists there can be no taking within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment.""14 The court of appeals noted, however, that one of the
plaintiffs contended that "if there was no implied-in-fact contract with the
FBI, his cooperation with the FBI was not voluntary."' 4 2 The plaintiff con-
tended that "in the absence of a contract, he was misled and, in effect, co-
erced into cooperating with the FBI and permitting his business to be used in
the sting operation." The plaintiffs argued that their consent to participate
in the undercover operation by allowing the FBI to run their business "was
predicated on assurances of compensation."
14 3
The court of appeals held that "[i]n order to grant a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, a court must determine that there is no set of facts
under which the plaintiff could recover."'" "This cannot be said here,"' 4 5
the court of appeals stated, adding: "The court on remand should reconsider
whether Janowsky's property was involuntarily taken by the FBI if it deter-
mines that there was no implied-in-fact contract with the FBI."'1
46
In Meek v. United States, the Claims Court addressed whether the In-
ternal Revenue Service's acceptance of $225,000 from the plaintiff in return
for the IRS's interest in property at a sealed-bid tax sale, where the property
was subject to a lien superior to the IRS's tax lien, constituted a compensable
taking of the plaintiff's $225,000 under the Fifth Amendment.148 The prop-
erty in question was encumbered by the IRS's tax lien and, unknown to the
plaintiff, by a superior lien held by a building supply company.1 49 Following
the sale of the property by the IRS to plaintiff for $225,000 but before the
plaintiff received a deed to the property, a trust, which had acquired the
building supply company's note on the property, foreclosed on its lien.
150
The IRS then reacquired the property from the trust and sold the property
again in a second sealed-bid tax sale to a party not involved in the suit for
$285,000 without refunding plaintiff's $225,000 payment. 
5
1
140. Id. at *10.
141. Id. at *9.
142. Id. at *10.
143. Id.
144. Id.; see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
145. Janowsky, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS at *10.
146. Id. at *10-11.
147. 26 CI. Ct. 1357 (1992), appeal docketed, No. 93-5043 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 15, 1992).
148. Id. at 1366.
149. Id. at 1358.
150. Id. at 1360.
151. Id. at 1361.
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In an opinion authored by Chief Judge Smith, the Claims Court directed
the entry of judgment for defendant, holding that there was no compensable
taking even though the property sold to the plaintiff was subject to a lien
superior to the IRS's tax lien and that the IRS had received a windfall. 52
The Claims Court reasoned that the plaintiff had voluntarily purchased the
property at the first tax sale "as is" and "where is" and had voluntarily paid
both the $50,000 down payment and the $175,000 balance following the
sealed-bid sale.' 53 The court noted that while the plaintiff's loss was unfor-
tunate, it was the result of the foreclosure of a superior lien and not due to
the IRS's use of governmental power. 54 In essence, according to Chief
Judge Smith, the plaintiff's problem stemmed from the limited property
right he voluntarily purchased and not from the government's interference
with such a property right.
155
C. Forfeiture/Seizure Cases
In Eversleigh v. United States,'56 the Claims Court addressed whether the
Postal Inspection Service's seizure of the plaintiffs' postal packages following
the arrest of one of the plaintiffs on drug-related charges and the Inspection
Service's subsequent declaration that the plaintiffs forfeited such property
constituted a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment. 5 7 The In-
spection Service seized the plaintiffs' postal packages and initiated forfeiture
proceedings against the plaintiffs, employing both mail and publication no-
tice to alert the plaintiffs of their right to contest the proceedings." 8 When
the plaintiffs failed to respond in a timely manner, the Service declared the
seized property to be forfeited.' 9 The plaintiffs then filed suit in the Claims
Court asserting that the Service's denial of their request for additional time
to file a claim for recovery of the property was an abuse of discretion and
that the forfeiture constituted a compensable taking within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment.'6°
In an opinion authored by Judge Wiese, the Claims Court dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint and held that the forfeiture proceeding employed by the
Inspection Service was "not a property deprivation of the sort that can give
rise to a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment."'' 6' Rather, the




156. 24 CI. Ct. 357 (1991).
157. Id. at 358-59.
158. Id.
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Claims Court reiterated the rule, derived from Noel v. United States,162 that
if the forfeiture of property used in criminal activity is carried out in a lawful
manner, it constitutes a permissible exercise of governmental authority and
does not require compensation. 6 a The Supreme Court, in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,"6 seemed sensitive to these principles when it
carved out from its categorical rule an exception for regulation of personal
property.165 On the other hand, if the forfeiture is carried out in a manner
that denies the property owner the procedural protections afforded by the
forfeiture statute, then the forfeiture is unlawful. 166 Such unlawful conduct,
however, cannot be the foundation for a Fifth Amendment taking claim.
167
"A taking claim may only be based on the Government's rightful exercise of
its property, contract or regulatory powers."' 168 The court was required to
dismiss the plaintiffs' taking claim since on the facts alleged, the Inspection
Service acted within the scope of its authority in seizing the plaintiffs'
property. 169
In B & F Trawlers, Inc. v. United States, 7' the Claims Court addressed
whether the United States Coast Guard's destruction and sinking of a burn-
ing vessel, which the Coast Guard was towing to port following seizure for
the presence of controlled substances, constituted a compensable taking
under the Fifth Amendment. 17' After determining that the plaintiffs' vessel
contained contraband, the Coast Guard towed the vessel toward Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba. 172 However, while being towed, a fire of unknown origin
broke out on the vessel and the Coast Guard used its .50 caliber machine
guns to sink the vessel because it constituted a floating danger to naviga-
tion. 1 73  The plaintiffs initially filed suit against the government in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging that
the Coast Guard failed to use due care in towing the vessel and that it delib-
erately sank the vessel. 174 Following reversal by the United States Court of
162. 16 Cl. Ct. 166 (1989).
163. Eversleigh, 24 Cl. Ct. at 359. The court added that "[n]or would it matter that the
owner of the forfeited property was unaware of its illicit use. Having entrusted the use of the
property to another, the owner bears the consequences of his actions." Id. (citing Calero To-
ledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-90 (1974)).
164. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
165. Id. at 2899.
166. Eversleigh, 24 Cl. Ct. at 359.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing Golder v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 513, 518 (1988)).
169. Id. at 360.
170. 27 Fed. Cl. 299 (1992).
171. Id. at 300.
172. Id. at 301.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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Appeals for the Fifth Circuit of the district court's dismissal of the case, 175
the district court held that the Coast Guard's actions in boarding, towing,
and destroying the vessel were shielded by the discretionary function excep-
tion to the Federal Tort Claims Act. 176 The district court also found that
the vessel had little or no value at the time of its destruction and that it
certainly would have had no value by the time the fire was extinguished.
177
The plaintiffs then filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims alleging that the
Coast Guard's actions in deliberately sinking the vessel constituted a com-
pensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.
178
In an opinion authored by Judge Robinson, the court granted the Govern-
ment's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. 17' The court first noted
that the plaintiffs' allegation that the Coast Guard acted unlawfully in sink-
ing the vessel sounded in tort, a claim over which the court had no jurisdic-
tion. '8 To the extent, however, that plaintiffs alleged that the Coast
Guard's conduct was lawful, plaintiffs had at least pleaded a claim within
the Court of Federal Claims' subject matter jurisdiction.' 8" The court then
analyzed the Coast Guard's conduct under the traditional Penn Central 182
three-factor "test" which examines: (1) the character of the governmental
action; (2) its economic impact upon the property owner; and (3) the degree
of interference with the property owner's reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations.18 3 The court first noted that the Coast Guard had validly exer-
cised the government's police power in sinking the burning vessel because it
posed a danger to navigation. 18 4 Next, the court concluded that the eco-
nomic impact of the Coast Guard's action was slight because the vessel was
nearly worthless due to severe fire damage.'85 Finally, the court found that
the plaintiffs, as owners of a United States registered sea vessel, reasonably
should have expected that, where a vessel represents a danger to navigation,
175. B & F Trawlers, Inc. v. United States, 841 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1988).
176. B & F Trawlers, 27 Fed. Cl. at 301 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 300.
179. Id. at 306.
180. Id. at 303-04. The plaintiffs alleged that the Coast Guard violated 14 U.S.C.
§ 88(a)(4) (1988), which prohibits the destruction of a vessel unless it constitutes a danger to
navigation, id., and 21 U.S.C.A. § 881 (West Supp. 1992), which regulates the forfeiture proce-
dures for vessels containing controlled substances. B & F Trawlers, 27 Fed. Cl. at 303-04. The
court responded that "[t]o the extent plaintiffs assert that the Coast Guard unlawfully sank
and destroyed the STAR TREK, plaintiffs have failed to allege a tenable claim for a compensa-
ble taking; that is, plaintiffs allege a claim sounding in tort, which is beyond the jurisdictional
parameters of this court." Id. at 304.
181. B & F Trawlers, 27 Fed. Cl. at 304.
182. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
183. Id.
184. B & F Trawlers, 27 Fed. Cl. at 305.
185. Id. at 306.
19931
Catholic University Law Review
the Coast Guard would have authority to destroy it in order to protect the
public by removing the danger to navigation.'1 6 For these reasons, the
Court found that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim for just com-
pensation under the Fifth Amendment."8 7
In Perry v. United States,18 8 the Court of Federal Claims addressed
whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) seizure and confiscation
of the property of an individual, who was indicted for alleged violations of
federal gambling laws on the basis of information obtained from improper
wiretaps, constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment."8 9 In Perry, as a
result of information obtained from a wiretap of the plaintiff, a district court
judge issued a search warrant authorizing the FBI to search the plaintiff's
safety deposit box. 19 0 The FBI seized cash and property of a value of
$70,675 contained in the plaintiff's safety deposit box on the ground that the
property seized was used to violate federal gambling laws. 9 ' Nearly fifty
days after the FBI seized her property, the plaintiff filed a claim of owner-
ship of the seized property and posted the requisite bond.' 92 However, the
FBI determined during subsequent internal proceedings that the plaintiff
had not provided sufficient information to establish that she was without
knowledge or reason to believe that the property was used to violate federal
gambling laws.' Accordingly, the FBI refused to return the property.'
9 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit subsequently de-
termined that the FBI had improperly obtained the underlying wiretap that
served as the basis for the FBI's search of the safety deposit box and for the
plaintiff's indictment. 195 The Government subsequently dismissed the in-
dictment. 196 Thereafter, the plaintiff filed suit in the Claims Court seeking
$70,675, plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs based upon the FBI's taking
of her property. 1
97
In an opinion authored by Judge Nettesheim, the Claims Court, relying
on Eversleigh v. United States, 198 dismissed the plaintiff's claim. 99 The
court noted that forfeiture proceedings are "quasi-criminal" in nature and
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 28 Fed. C1. 82 (1993).
189. Id. at 84.





195. United States v. Feiste, 961 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1992).
196. Perry, 28 Fed. C1. at 84.
197. Id.
198. 24 Cl. Ct. 357 (1991).
199. Perry, 28 Fed. Ci. at 84-85.
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undertaken in support of the criminal laws.2" The court stated that if the
forfeiture of property used in criminal activity is carried out in a lawful man-
ner, it constitutes a permissible exercise of governmental authority and does
not require just compensation.2 "1 On the other hand, if the forfeiture is ef-
fected in a manner that deprives the property owner of procedural protec-
tions afforded by the authorizing statute, the forfeiture is unlawful and
cannot be the predicate for a Fifth Amendment taking claim.202 Rather,
where the taking is unlawful, the plaintiff's remedy would be a suit for re-
turn of the seized property, equitable relief that the Claims Court was not
empowered to grant.20 3
In Alde, S.A. v. United States,2° 4 the Court of Federal Claims addressed
whether the United States Customs Service entered into an implied-in-fact
bailment contract when it seized the plaintiff's aircraft, which was destroyed
by Hurricane Hugo while in the Custom Service's possession, and whether
such seizure constituted a compensable taking.20 5 When the Customs Ser-
vice seized the plaintiff's aircraft for failing to request landing rights, it in-
formed the plaintiff that prior to releasing the aircraft, the plaintiff would
have to pay an administrative penalty, seizure and storage costs, and execute
a Hold Harmless Agreement.20 6 The Customs Service then seized the plain-
tiff's aircraft again for violating the export declaration laws and instituted
forfeiture proceedings. 207 The plaintiff posted a bond in connection with the
forfeiture proceedings and sought the return of the aircraft. 2 8 During the
period that the aircraft was in the Custom Service's possession, Hurricane
Hugo caused extensive damage to the aircraft. 2 9 The plaintiff acquired the
aircraft after paying the Customs Service the requested seizure and storage
costs.21° The plaintiff then filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims seeking
payment for damages to the aircraft on the theory the Customs Service
200. Id. at 85.
201. Id.
202. Id.; see also Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 898-99 (Fed. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
203. Eversleigh, 24 Cl. Ct. at 85; see supra notes 162-75 and accompanying text.
204. 28 Fed. Cl. 26 (1993).
205. Id. at 27.
206. Id. at 28.
207. Id. Both statutes relied upon by the Customs Service for its seizure authority, 19
U.S.C. § 1436(a)(2) (1988) and 22 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988), provided that property seized was
subject to forfeiture. Aide, 28 Fed. Cl. at 28.
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breached an implied-in-fact bailment contract. 2 11 Alternatively, plaintiff
sought just compensation for the taking of its aircraft by seizure.
21 2
In an opinion authored by Judge Nettesheim, the Court of Federal Claims
granted the Government's motion for summary judgment.2 13 Initially, the
court held that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the elements necessary
to prove the existence of an implied-in-fact contract.21 4 The court noted the
plaintiff had failed to establish that the government intended to enter into a
bailment arrangement for the seized property. 21 5 The court observed that
ordinarily no reason would exist for law enforcement officers to offer a bail-
ment agreement to a person whose property is being seized, adding that uni-
lateral acts of government officials acting pursuant to their police powers
"do not suggest a mutual intent to enter into a bailment contract. ,216 The
court found that there was no evidence of either an offer or an acceptance of
a bailment arrangement by either party.2 17 Indeed, the Customs Service spe-
cifically informed the plaintiff that prior to release of the aircraft, plaintiff
would have to pay an administrative penalty, seizure and storage costs as
well as execute a Hold Harmless Agreement. 2 " Additionally, the Customs
Service never represented that it intended to enter into a bailment arrange-
21ment. ' 9 Moreover, unlike a typical bailment situation, the Customs Service
made continuing efforts to deprive the plaintiff permanently of its aircraft
through forfeiture proceedings. 22° As the court noted: "When property is
211. Id. at 29.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 34.
214. Id. at 30-33. The court noted that in order to establish the existence of an implied-in-
fact contract over which the court has jurisdiction, the plaintiff must demonstrate the existence
of the same elements as an express contract, i.e., mutual intent to contract including an offer,
an acceptance, and adequate consideration. Id. at 30 (citing Kollsman v. United States, 25 Cl.
Ct. 500, 514 (1992)). The court also noted that, in situations involving the government, the
plaintiff must establish that the officer whose conduct is in question had the requisite actual
authority to bind the government. Id.
215. Id. The court stated that "[t]he[ ] cases evince a uniform reluctance to find an implied
bailment contract in cases similar to the one at hand where plaintiff's property has been seized
pursuant to the Government's exercise of its police power." Id.; see also Ysasi v. Rivkind, 856
F.2d 1520, 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that there was no bailment contract formed when
the Immigration and Naturalization Service seized a truck for suspected violation of immigra-
tion laws); Marshall v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 497, 499 (1990) (denying a request to hold the
government as bailee for the United States Marshall Service's seizure of powder suspected of
violating federal law); Scope Enters., Ltd. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 875, 884 (1989) (stating
that money seized by the Customs Service for the unlawful export of technology did not create
a bailment agreement).




220. Id. at 32. The court added:
[Vol. 42:863
Survey of Recent Takings Cases
seized pursuant to the Government's police powers, it is particularly difficult
to assume formation of a bailment contract."22' The court also held that the
plaintiff's allegations that the government acted unlawfully meant that the
Customs Service's acts could not have given rise to a compensable taking.
222
Because a compensable taking could only occur when the government acted
lawfully, the plaintiff's allegations that the property was taken unlawfully-
which were required to be accepted as true in the context of defendant's
motion for summary judgment-necessarily eliminated the foundation of
plaintiff's taking claim.223
III. DEFINITION OF PROPERTY AND MEASURE OF JUST COMPENSATION
In Board of County Supervisors v. United States, 224 the Claims Court ad-
dressed whether the government's legislative taking of land adjacent to the
Manassas National Battlefield Park, which rendered valueless proffers ac-
cepted by Prince William County as a condition of rezoning the property for
development, constituted a compensable Fifth Amendment taking of the
County's property. 22' As a condition of obtaining rezoning, the developer
voluntarily made certain proffers to the County.226 The proffers included an
agreement to provide recreational facilities, such as tennis courts and a
swimming pool, and to make monetary contributions for public works
projects, such as sewer and water facilities and major roadways.227 When
Congress enacted the Manassas National Battlefield Park Amendments of
1988,228 which vested title to the developer's property in the United States,
the County filed suit alleging that as a result of the government's legislative
taking, it lost the benefit of the proffers, which, according to the County,
One whose property is seized subject to forfeiture cannot reasonably assert that the
Government is "holding the property for a specific purpose" and that the property
will be returned or safeguarded. The only reasonable understanding of "forfeiture" is
that the property rights of the owner have been or will be extinguished.
Id.
221. Id. at 31.
222. Id. at 33. The court concluded broadly: "As in respect of cases dealing with the
formation of an implied bailment contract based on the seizure of property by the Govern-
ment, assertions that a taking occurred have been uniformly rejected. Seizures carried out by
the Government under its police power are not takings." Id. at 34.
223. Id. at 33. The court noted that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain challenges to
the propriety of the government's initial seizure of the aircraft. Id. at 33 n.7.
224. 23 Cl. Ct. 205 (1991), dismissed, 27 Fed. Cl. 339 (1992).
225. Id. at 207-08.
226. Id. at 207.
227. Id.
228. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 10001, 102
Stat. 3342, 3810 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 429(b) (Supp. III 1991)).
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constituted property under the Fifth Amendment and for the taking of
which the County was entitled to just compensation.22 9
In a case of first impression, Judge Tidwell of the Claims Court granted
the Government's motion for partial dismissal of the County's claim. 230 The
court ruled that the developer's proffers, in and of themselves, are not prop-
erty interests.231  Rather, proffers become binding development restrictions
on the owner until subsequent rezoning or, as a matter of practicality, until
development is stopped.23 2 Once the legislative taking precluded the pro-
posed development, the restrictions imposed upon the developer "simply
ceased to exist as of the date of the taking; they were not taken. ,233
The Claims Court also rejected the County's contention that the proffers
constituted a protected "dedication," i.e., "the setting aside of land, or of an
interest therein, to the public use; or a form of transfer by an owner to the
public of a fee or lesser interest in land., 234 The court reasoned that, under
Virginia law, proffers accepted by a county zoning board as a condition of
rezoning were not dedications because the county maintained the ability to
rezone the property unilaterally after it accepted the proffers. 235
The Claims Court similarly rejected the County's assertion that the prof-
fers constituted "restrictive covenants" that are compensable property inter-
ests under Virginia law if taken by eminent domain.236 The court posited
that even though the proffers "touched and concerned" the land, there was
no privity of estate between the County and the developer.237 Accordingly,
the proffers were not restrictive covenants under Virginia law.238 The court
229. Board of County Supervisors, 23 Cl. Ct. at 207.
230. Id. at 214.
231. Id. at 209. The court explained that the proffers were the result of "[c]onditional
zoning[, which] provides zoning authorities with added flexibility. In situations where rezon-
ing otherwise would effect an unacceptably drastic change, conditional rezoning mitigates the
impacts to an acceptable level by adding certain use limitations, or conditions, i.e., proffers."
Id. at 208.
232. Id. at 209.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 210 (citing City of Norfolk v. Meredith, 132 S.E.2d 431, 434 (Va. 1963)).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 210-12. The court noted:
Had [the property owner] sold the property at issue, any new owner would have
taken title subject to the proffers, and would have been permitted to develop the land
only in accordance with the zoning. Proffers are noted in official zoning maps, can be
recorded, and effect title. Therefore, the court does not believe that the proffers
merely were collateral to the land, but that they did "touch and concern" the land.
Id. at 211.
237. Id. at 210.
238. Id.
[Vol. 42:863
Survey of Recent Takings Cases
also held that the proffers were not equitable servitudes under Virginia
law.
239
The County additionally sought compensation for approximately sixteen
acres of land that the developers had deeded to it in fee simple for public
streets. 2" That claim was unaffected by the partial dismissal, and in a sepa-
rate opinion after trial on that claim, Judge Tidwell held that because the
County provided no evidence of loss as a result of the taking of the deeded
land, it was not entitled to compensation for the legislative taking of that
property. 24' As Judge Tidwell noted, courts generally "apply the 'substitute
facilities' standard to determine just compensation for streets, sewers or
other public facilities for which fair market value cannot be determined ac-
curately. '' 242 However, the County in this case stipulated that substitute fa-
cilities were not required.243 The court went on to observe that when no
substitute facility is necessary and when the lands dedicated as streets cannot
be used for any purpose that would bring the public entity profit, the taking
results in no loss and the party may not recover any compensation, except
for nominal damages.
24 4
The court held that the County's interest in the land in question was bur-
dened for use as streets at the time of the taking and that the County had
failed to establish that it could have abandoned the roads and sold the prop-
erty as unburdened land. 245 The court concluded that because the County
had not met its burden of proof to establish any loss which resulted from the
taking, it was not entitled to compensation.
2 4 6
239. Id. at 211. The court found that
[p]laintiff did no more than discuss, in general terms, the reasons this court should
find that an equitable servitude exists, i.e., equitable servitudes and proffers both are
promises. Plaintiff pointed to no authority, nor has the court been able to find any, to
sustain the contention that a zoning ordinance may be considered an equitable
servitude.
Id. at 212.
Thereafter, on December 12, 1991, the County sued the developers in Virginia state court
seeking to recover the value of the proffers from them. Ultimately, however, the County vol-
untarily dismissed that action. Board of County Supervisors v. Perch Assocs. Ltd. Partner-
ship, Chancery No. 32215, (Prince William County Cir. Ct. Mar. 11, 1993) (ordering dismissal
without prejudice). [The authors' firm was counsel for certain of the defendants in that
action.]
240. Board of County Supervisors v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 339 (1992).
241. Id. at 348.
242. Id. at 342 (citing United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 706 F.2d 1356, 1359 (5th Cir.
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 469 U.S. 24 (1984)).
243. Id. at 341.
244. Id. at 343.
245. Id. at 345-46.
246. Id. at 347-48. The court stated:
Because the County's rights of way were burdened both by use and transferability,
it must have proved at trial that the use to which its rights of way were restricted,
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IV. THE IMPACT OF UNR AND KEENE
Several areas of the Court of Federal Claims' procedural jurisprudence
have significant practical effects on the litigation of takings cases against the
federal government. One of the most important is the jurisdictional issue
raised when a takings plaintiff sues the government in two forums--one the
Court of Federal Claims, in which the plaintiff seeks just compensation, and
the other a United States district court, in which the plaintiff may litigate
other related issues concerning the takings claim. The impact of district
court litigation on the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is gov-
erned by 28 U.S.C § 1500, and interpretation of that statute has undergone
significant evolution in the past year.247 In UNR Industries, Inc. v. United
States, 248 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held
that when a complaint is filed in the Court of Federal Claims while the same
claim is pending in another court, the Court of Federal Claims lacks juris-
diction.249 That rule is a trap for the unwary requiring careful litigation
practice and, possibly, difficult tactical decisions.
public streets, was profitable or did not preclude other profitable uses. The County
provided no evidence at trial that it could sell the street rights of way to a private
party, or any other entity, for street purposes,
Neither parties' expert appraiser testified at trial as to the value of the County's
rights of way as burdened for street purposes. While defendant's expert appraiser
based his appraisal on the market value of the rights of way as unencumbered land,
less percentages for certain other perceived restrictions on the rights of way, he did
not provide a percentage reduction based upon the land's burden for street purposes.
Rather, his estimate was based upon the value of the rights of way as burdened by
encumbrances he perceived lands no longer burdened for street purposes would have,
i.e., sewer and water easements. Because plaintiff could not provide the court with
evidence that its rights of way as encumbered had value, to prevail it had to provide
the court with evidence of other profitable uses of the land as burdened .... Plaintiff
did not even attempt to do so at trial. As a result, plaintiff did not meet is [sic]
burden of proof to establish any loss which resulted from the taking.
Id. (citations omitted).
247. The statute states:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim
for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any other court
any suit or process against the United States or any person who, at the time when the
cause of action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or
professing to act, directly or indirectly under the authority of the United States.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1500 (West Supp. 1993). For a discussion of the statutory history and related
case law, see David Schwartz, Section 1500 of the Judicial Code and Duplicate Suits Against
the Government and Its Agents, 55 GEO. L.J. 573 (1967).
248. 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 2035 (1993).
249. Id. at 1021. UNR involved suits filed in the Claims Court by manufacturers and
suppliers of asbestos products seeking indemnification from the federal government for dam-
ages awarded in personal injury suits filed against them by shipyard workers exposed to asbes-
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Section 1500 states that the Court of Federal Claims "shall not have juris-
diction of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has
pending in any other court any suit or process against the United States."25
Before UNR, the Court of Federal Claims routinely exercised jurisdiction
over takings cases despite the fact that another suit was pending in another
court.251 Most recently, in Oak Forest, Inc. v. United States,252 the court,
through Judge Bruggink, had before it a takings claim brought by plaintiffs
while a quiet title proceeding was pending in a federal district court in South
Carolina. 253 The court, faced with a motion to dismiss by the United States
for lack of jurisdiction, held that it had jurisdiction over the takings claim,
but that the action should be suspended pending resolution of the previously
tos. Id. at 1015. At the time the plaintiffs filed their actions in the Claims Court, there were
suits based on the same facts pending before federal district courts. Id. The Claims Court
held that 28 U.S.C. § 1500 precluded it from exercising jurisdiction where, at the time the
Claims Court action was filed, the plaintiffs had pending similar claims before the district
courts. UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 146, 155 (1989).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit undertook what it described as "a
comprehensive effort to set out the proper interpretation of a jurisdictional statute, a matter
that does not require a pointed dispute between parties." UNR, 962 F.2d at 1023. In that
regard, the court stated: "In the course of this interpretive effort, if prior cases are seen as
inconsistent, it is incumbent on the court to acknowledge their nonviability." Id. The court
concluded that under § 1500:
1) if the same claim is pending in another court at the time the complaint is filed in
the Claims Court, the Claims Court has no jurisdiction, regardless of when an objec-
tion is raised or acted on; 2) if the same claim is filed in another court after the
complaint is filed in the Claims Court, the Claims Court is by that action divested of
jurisdiction, regardless of when the court memorializes the fact by order of dismissal;
and 3) if the same claim has been finally disposed of by another court before the
complaint is filed in the Claims Court, ordinary rules of res judicata and available
defenses apply.
Id. at 1021.
250. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1500.
251. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 375, 376 (1988), later
proceeding, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 154 (1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-5050 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 1991).
In Loveladies, at the time plaintiff commenced its takings case in the Claims Court, plaintiff
had pending an action in the district court seeking judicial review of the denial of its permit
application. The government did not assert that 28 U.S.C. § 1500 in any way affected the
Claims Court's jurisdiction until after the en banc decision in UNR, by which time the case
had been argued on the merits in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-5050 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 15, 1991) (United States' Motion Suggesting Lack of Jurisdiction in the Claims Court
filed May 5, 1992).
252. 23 Cl. Ct. 90 (1991).
253. Id. at 92. The plaintiffs in the Claims Court action were not parties to the quiet title
action, but a consent order had been entered in that proceeding pursuant to which the Govern-
ment was to use its best efforts to effect the joinder in that proceeding of the Claims Court
plaintiffs, among others, whose property interests might be affected by the outcome of the quiet
title action. Id. at 93, 98.
1993]
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filed district court case. 254 In addition, in a line of cases stretching back
twenty-five years, the predecessors of the Court of Federal Claims and
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, held that when the
Court of Federal Claims case is filed first, that court's jurisdiction is not
affected by the filing of a second lawsuit in district court.255
The Federal Circuit's decision in UNR changed these rules dramatically,
as evidenced by post-UNR cases. For example, in Cascade Development Co.
v. United States,256 the plaintiff filed a takings claim in the Claims Court,
and then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in federal district court.257
Relying on UNR before Keene, the Court of Federal Claims, through Judge
Tidwell, ruled that it "lost jurisdiction over the matters pending before it, as
a matter of law, when the district court case was filed."'258 In Donnelly v.
254. Id. at 98. The Government contended that the appropriate remedy for the plaintiffs
was to join the quiet title proceeding filed in the district court by other parties pursuant to the
Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 24092 (1988). Oak Forest, 23 Cl. Ct. at 93. Even though the
Claims Court might have jurisdiction over the takings case, the Government argued that
where title was disputed, the Quiet Title Act dictated the district court action as the exclusive
remedy. Id. at 94. The Claims Court found that "the specific language in the Quiet Title Act
disavow[s] any intent to affect such claims," id. at 95, and concluded that "the mere fact that
title must be determined as part of this proceeding does not oust the court of jurisdiction." Id.
at 96; see also Gila Gin v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 1001, 1002 (1982) (holding that "the
jurisdiction of the district courts over quiet title actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2409a does not
preclude us from determining actions for just compensation even though the existence of a
taking vel non depends upon whether the government had title to the property it allegedly
took").
Having found that plaintiff had viable claims under the Tucker Act, the court noted that
"[t]he title aspects of this proceeding are largely duplicated in the district court proceedings."
Oak Forest, 23 Cl. Ct. at 98. The court noted "the possibility of inconsistent results," id., and
observed that "Congress has clearly stated its instructions that the remedy of a declaration of
present title as against the United States should be litigated in the district court." Id. The
court concluded that "it would be a substantial waste ofjudicial resources and a burden on the
defendant to litigate title . . . in two fora." Id.
255. See Clark v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 649, 652 (1985) (stating that the Government had
conceded this interpretation of § 1500); A.C. Seeman, Inc. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 386, 389
(1984); ATL, Inc. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 49, 52 (1983); Camero v. United States, 345 F.2d
798, 800 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Tecon Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 943 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 976 (1966).
256. 27 Fed. Cl. 595 (1993), appeal docketed, No. 93-5087 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 1993).
257. Id. at 597.
258. Id. Judge Tidwell relied on the Federal Circuit's ruling in UNR that "if the same
claim is filed in another court after the complaint is filed in the Claims Court, the Claims
Court is by that action divested of jurisdiction." Id. (quoting UNR, 962 F.2d at 1021). That
ruling was, in turn, based upon the court of appeals' purported overruling of Tecon Engineers,
Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 943 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 976 (1966). UNR,
962 F.2d at 1023. The purported overruling of Tecon was dicta, however, because none of the
cases before the court of appeals in UNR involved the Tecon fact pattern, i.e., a case in which
the plaintiff, at the time of filing in the Court of Federal Claims, does not have an action
pending in any other court for or in respect to the same claim. Keene, 113 S. Ct. at 2041 n.4,
2044.
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United States,2 59 another pre-Keene decision, the court was faced with an
inverse condemnation claim filed by the plaintiff while a quiet title action
was pending in a federal district court in Alaska.26° Following the precepts
of UNR before Keene, the court, in an opinion by Judge Turner, determined
"that the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction should be
granted because the action pending in federal district court... when plaintiff
filed the action in this court, divests this court of jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1500., '261
When it reviewed the UNR decision a year later, the Supreme Court, in
Keene Corp. v. United States,2 62 appeared to take a more moderate ap-
proach. It held that § 1500 is governed by the principle that subject matter
jurisdiction is determined as of the date an action is filed, and that if a dis-
trict court action asserting the "same claim" within the meaning of § 1500
was pending at the time the plaintiff filed its complaint in the Court of Fed-
eral Claims, that court would lack jurisdiction over the case. 26 3 The Court
invoked the "longstanding principle that 'the jurisdiction of the Court de-
pends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought.' ,,264 That
principle has always been understood to mean that "after vesting, jurisdic-
tion] cannot be ousted by subsequent events., 265 By adopting this "time of
filing" principle, the Court cast serious doubt on dicta in the Federal Cir-
cuit's UNR decision, which would have extended § 1500 to divest the Court
259. 28 Fed. Cl. 62 (1993).
260. Id. at 63.
261. Id. at 65.
262. Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2035, 2040-41 (1993).
263. Id. at 2040.
264. Id. (quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824)).
265. Mollan, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 539; see Gwaltney, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 69 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (if subject matter jurisdiction "existed
when the suit was brought, 'subsequent events' cannot 'ous[t]' the court of jurisdiction") (quot-
ing Mollan, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 539)); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303
U.S. 283, 289-90 (1938) (stating that the amount in controversy requirement is determined by
allegations at the time of filing, and "[e]vents occurring subsequent to the institution of suit
which reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction"); see
also Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93, n.1 (1957); Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922) ("Jurisdiction once acquired ... is not divested by a subse-
quent change in the in the citizenship of the parties," and "[m]uch less ... by the intervention
.. . of a party whose presence is not essential to a decision of the controversy between the
original parties.") (citation omitted); Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U.S. 112, 118 (1894) (when the
original suit was brought, the court acquired jurisdiction of the controversy, and no subse-
quent change of the parties could effect that jurisdiction); Clarke v. Mathewson, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 164, 171 (1838); Dunn v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1, 3 (1834) (stating that "no change in
the residence or condition of the parties can take away a jurisdiction which has once
attached").
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of Federal Claims of jurisdiction based on a later-filed district court
action.
2 66
Thus, although the Keene Court expressly declined to reach the issue of a
later-filed district court action,2 67 its reasoning indicates that where no other
action is pending at the time the suit is filed in the Court of Federal Claims,
a subsequent action filed in another forum ought not to divest the Court of
Federal Claims of jurisdiction.2 61 If that interpretation of Keene prevails, it
would result in the following rules of practice: (1) If a suit is filed in the
Court of Federal Claims at a time when the same claim seeking the same
relief269 is pending elsewhere, jurisdiction will be lacking in the Court of
Federal Claims; (2) If the same claim is not pending in any other action at
the commencement of the Court of Federal Claims action, jurisdiction will
be present throughout the proceeding even if a district court action is later
filed.
These two rules create significant tactical issues for takings plaintiffs who
must already guide their clients through somewhat muddled case law on the
ripeness of takings claims before filing suit in the Court of Federal Claims.
In just one example, if obtaining judicial review of the necessary "final
agency action" requires, a district court action against the federal agency
responsible for the regulatory program at issue, that litigation may have to
have run its course and be completely over before the Court of Federal
266. The Court commented, "In applying § 1500 to the facts of this case, we find it unnec-
essary to consider, much less repudiate, the 'judicially created exceptions' to § 1500 found in
Tecon Engineers... " Keene, 113 S. Ct. at 2044.
267. Id. at 2041 n.4.
268. In our capacity as counsel for the plaintiffs in Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States,
18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989), modified, 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990), aff'd, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991), we have taken this position in response to the Government's
effort to use the UNR /Keene decisions to undo the judgment our clients won in 1989. Indeed,
the Government's attempt to apply UNR/Keene in Whitney shows that it is prepared to ex-
ploit the new interpretation of § 1500 even to the point of seeking to apply it to a just compen-
sation judgment entered in 1989 and fully appealed prior to the time the Federal Circuit issued
UNR.
269. The Supreme Court in Keene expressly left open the question "whether two actions
based on the same operative facts" would trigger a § 1500 bar where those actions involve
"completely different relief." Keene, 113 S. Ct. at 2043 n.6 (citing Boston Five Cents Say.
Bank, FSB v. United States, 864 F.2d 137 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Casman v. United States, 135 Ct.
Cl. 647 (1956)). UNR purported to overrule these two cases cited in Keene. UNR, 962 F.2d at
1022 n.3. The Federal Circuit recently expressed its intention to revisit en banc the viability of
the Casman exception to § 1500 in a case which squarely presents the issue. See Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-5050 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 15, 1991) (order dated Sept. 28, 1993 specifying questions to be addressed in briefs inci-
dent to the court's en banc consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims).
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Claims will once again have jurisdiction to entertain the eventual takings
claim.27°
V. THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT ACTION
In Flowers Mill Associates v. United States,2 7 ' the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) had determined that a building which the plaintiff pro-
posed to construct on land adjacent to an airport would constitute a hazard
to air navigation.272 The plaintiff asserted that the FAA's determination ef-
fected a compensable taking of his property.27 3 The Government moved to
dismiss on the ground that the landowner failed to state a taking claim upon
which relief could be granted.2 74 While recognizing the severe practical con-
sequences of the FAA's determination, the Claims Court, in an opinion by
Judge Turner, held that the Government's motion should be granted because
the FAA's determination was only advisory and had no legally enforceable
effect.275 Stating that the issue was apparently one of first impression in the
Claims Court and the Federal Circuit, Judge Turner noted that unlike the
270. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, No. 91-5050 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 1991)
(order dated Sept. 1, 1993 ordering, sua sponte, rehearing en banc "on the question of the
jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims").
Another obvious problem raised by the revision of rules in UNR and Keene relates to the
operation of the six-year statute of limitations applicable in takings actions against the United
States. Because of the change in interpretation of § 1500, numerous plaintiffs now face unex-
pected dismissal of takings actions on jurisdictional grounds due to the simultaneous pendency
of district court litigation. Ordinarily, the jurisdictional problem could be cured by dismissing
the district court action and then refiling the takings claim. But some plaintiffs may face
potential loss of claims if the limitations period has run during the period the takings claim has
been in litigation. The problem remains even in litigation initiated after the UNR and Keene
cases, because plaintiffs may find themselves unable to assert a takings claim in a timely way
due to the need to litigate some related issue in the district court. Unless completion of that
district court action is deemed a prerequisite to a ripe takings claim, the limitations period
might run before the plaintiff is jurisdictionally able to file in the Court of Federal Claims.
In her separate opinion in UNR, Chief Judge Nies recognized this problem, and, pointing to
the doctrine of equitable tolling, stated unequivocally: "Where a party has possibly two claims
for relief and is barred from asserting them concurrently by section 1500, I do not believe the
period allowed for bringing the additional or alternative claim should arbitrarily be cut off or
even shortened. Section 1500 does not require such forfeiture." UNR Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 962 F.2d 1013, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Nies, C.J., stating additional views). Since then,
the Court of Federal Claims has squarely resolved the problem, at least with respect to litiga-
tion filed prior to UNRIKeene, by holding that a timely filed claim in the Court of Federal
Claims that is later dismissed pursuant to § 1500 tolls the running of the limitations period for
purposes of refiling the claim after the jurisdictional defect under § 1500 has been cured.
George F. Miller Farms, Ltd. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 672,674 (1993).
271. 23 Cl. Ct. 182 (1991).
272. Id. at 184.
273. Id. at 183.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 188.
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wetlands permit context, the FAA's determination that plaintiff's proposed
construction in close proximity to an airport was a hazard to air navigation
did not legally preclude the plaintiff from constructing the proposed build-
ing. 276 Specifically, the court stated, "FAA's hazard finding was advisory
only and not legally enforceable. A landowner is not required to obtain a
permit from FAA before proceeding with development, and FAA has no
power to prevent construction." '27 7 Judge Turner noted that "[i]f Flowers
Mill successfully obtained the necessary financing, insurance, and state per-
mits, FAA would be powerless to prevent construction of the proposed
building."
278
Conceding that the FAA determination was technically only advisory and
that no FAA-issued permit was required, the plaintiff argued that the practi-
cal effect of the hazard determination constituted a taking "since plaintiff
was unable to obtain the necessary financing and insurance to commence
construction. 2 79 Concluding that "[t]here simply is no legal authority to
support this position,"'2 ° Judge Turner held that it was clear from the plead-
ings that, even assuming the FAA's determination had damaged the plaintiff
by making it more difficult to develop the property as intended, the plaintiff
would be unable to prove any set of facts entitling it to relief because the
FAA "ha[d] not acted in any way to interfere with plaintiff's property
rights."2'' Accordingly, the court granted the Government's motion to
dismiss.
In Shelden v. United States,28 2 the Claims Court addressed whether the
Government's action in filing a lis pendens on certain property as a conse-
quence of the conviction of the mortgagors under RICO and an order of
forfeiture entered thereafter resulted in a compensable taking because it pre-
vented the plaintiffs, innocent mortgagees, from foreclosing on the property
when the mortgagors defaulted on their loan.2"' The Claims Court initially
held that the government's action in filing a lis pendens on the property did
effect a compensable taking.28 4 The premise of the court's opinion was its
conclusion from the record that plaintiffs would have been able to foreclose
276. Id.
277. Id. at 188-89. The court added that "[e]ven assuming that the economic impact of the
eviction regulations on Flowers Mill would be great and that it would interfere with their
distinct, investment-backed expectations, the FAA action cannot be the basis of a Fifth
Amendment taking because of the voluntary nature of the regulatory scheme." Id.
278. Id. at 190.
279. Id. at 189.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 189-90.
282. 19 Cl. Ct. 247 (1990), vacated, 26 Cl. Ct. 375 (1992).
283. Id. at 248-50.
284. Id. at 252.
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but for the filing of the notice of lis pendens.2 85 Eight months later, the
Government moved for reconsideration under United States Claims Court
Rule 60(b)(2) based upon newly discovered evidence that undermined the
premise for the court's earlier opinion.28 6 Upon reconsideration, in an opin-
ion authored by Chief Judge Smith, the Claims Court dismissed the plain-
tiffs' claim. 287 The court noted that in order for there to be a taking, the
plaintiffs were required to prove that they had a right to foreclose on the
property and that the government prevented them from exercising that
right.2 88 The court held that the government's action in filing a lis pendens
did not result in a taking because the plaintiffs never perfected their right to
foreclose.289 The Claims Court found that the mortgagors' conduct, not the
government's lis pendens, precluded plaintiffs from foreclosing. 29° There-
fore, the court held that there was no taking by the United States.29 That
decision was reversed by the Federal Circuit in an opinion issued just before
this article went to press.292
VI. CONCLUSION
In these many areas of takings law, from regulatory takings to forfeiture,
the Court of Federal Claims has continued in the last two years to distin-
285. Id. at 252-53. The court rebutted the Government's argument that it never exerted
control over the plaintiff's property:
Such a contention runs counter to the uncontroverted facts recounted above, and
cannot be taken seriously. [The government]'s argument asks the court to believe
that while the United States asserted a lien on real property, and prevented innocent
mortgagees from foreclosing on the property, it did not in any way control that prop-
erty. The government's position is, as the late Chief Judge Marvin Jones once said,
"[slingularly free from any suspicion of logic."
Id. at 252 (quoting Belcher v. United States, 94 Ct. Cf. 137, 140 (1941) (footnote omitted)).
286. Shelden v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 375, 378 (1992) rev'd, No. 92-5154 (Fed. Cir. Oct.
15, 1993).
287. Id. at 381-82.
288. Id. at 379.
289. Id. at 380.
290. Id. The court observed:
Under state law, plaintiffs had the right to foreclose only if the Washingtons [the
party to whom the property was sold] failed to cure. Even if the government's filing
of the lis pendens could have prevented plaintiffs from foreclosing on their property.
The fact that the Washingtons were able to cure their defaults prior to the foreclo-
sure sale leads to the conclusion that the plaintiffs never had the right to foreclose
.... [P]laintiffs have not shown any evidence in the record which illustrates any
damage to their property interest caused by the lis pendens. Plaintiffs have not suf-
fered a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment.
Id.
291. Id.
292. Shelden v. United States, No. 92-5154 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 1993) (order of forfeiture
following RICO conviction effected transfer of mortgagor's interest to United States and ren-
dered Shelden's mortgage lien unenforceable due to government's sovereign immunity.
1993]
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guish itself as a major force in the development of the law. In some respects,
the court has been a difficult forum for takings plaintiffs who have sought to
push the law of regulatory takings further than the court has been willing to
go. Nonetheless, the court has been willing to find a taking when govern-
ment action has too drastically interfered with settled expectations. In addi-
tion, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has signaled a willingness
to find a taking by physical occupation on facts that might previously have
been regarded as rising merely to the level of trespass.
